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Introduction: As providers transition from “fee-for-service” to “pay-for-performance” models, focus 
has shifted to improving performance. This trend extends to the emergency department (ED) where 
visits continue to increase across the United States. Our objective was to determine whether displaying 
public performance metrics of physician triage data could drive intangible motivators and improve triage 
performance in the ED.
Methods: This is a single institution, time-series performance study on a physician-in-triage system. 
Individual physician baseline metrics—number of patients triaged and dispositioned per shift—were 
obtained and prominently displayed with identifiable labels during each quarterly physician group 
meeting. Physicians were informed that metrics would be collected and displayed quarterly and that there 
would be no bonuses, punishments, or required training; physicians were essentially free to do as they 
wished. It was made explicit that the goal was to increase the number triaged, and while the number 
dispositioned would also be displayed, it would not be a focus, thereby acting as this study’s control. At 
the end of one year, we analyzed metrics.
Results: The group’s average number of patients triaged per shift were as follows: Q1-29.2; Q2-31.9; 
Q3-34.4; Q4-36.5 (Q1 vs Q4, p < 0.00001). The average numbers of patients dispositioned per shift were 
Q1-16.4; Q2-17.8; Q3-16.9; Q4-15.3 (Q1 vs Q4, p = 0.14). The top 25% of Q1 performers increased their 
average numbers triaged from Q1-36.5 to Q4-40.3 (ie, a statistically insignificant increase of 3.8 patients 
per shift [p = 0.07]). The bottom 25% of Q1 performers, on the other hand, increased their averages from 
Q1-22.4 to Q4-34.5 (ie, a statistically significant increase of 12.2 patients per shift [p = 0.0013]).
Conclusion: Public performance metrics can drive intangible motivators (eg, purpose, mastery, and 
peer pressure), which can be an effective, low-cost strategy to improve individual performance, achieve 
institutional goals, and thrive in the pay-for-performance era. [West J Emerg Med. 2020;21(2)247–251.]
INTRODUCTION 
As healthcare reimbursement shifts from “fee-for-service” 
to “pay-for-performance,” strategies designed to incentivize 
improved physician performance must evolve in tandem. 
Across industries, financial incentives and disciplinary threats 
are frequently used; however, prior studies have demonstrated 
that these so-called extrinsic motivators lead to worsened 
performance for any task requiring even rudimentary 
cognitive ability.1 In contrast, prior studies have also shown 
that intrinsic motivation—personal motivators based on a 
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Population Health Research Capsule
What do we already know about this issue?
Evidence on public reporting to drive 
improvements has been mixed. This is the first 
study to analyze whether publicizing individual 
metrics affects emergency department (ED) 
triage performance.
What was the research question?
Does publicly displaying physician 
performance metrics influence the individual 
physician’s future triage performance?
What was the major finding of the study?
Displaying public performance metrics 
correlated with a statistically significant increase 
in the average patients triaged per hour.
How does this improve population health?
Improved triage performance has been shown 
to lead to improvements in door-to-physician 
time, length of stay, and left without being seen 
visits, despite increasing ED volume.
sense of pride, accomplishment, and mastery rather than a 
desire for money or fear of reprisal—is much more effective 
at driving performance outcomes for highly cognitive tasks. In 
fact, as open disclosure of healthcare performance outcomes 
becomes more common as a health policy tool,2 advocates 
cite that public disclosure of poor individual physician 
performance directly drives positive physician behaviors that 
result in improved performance and patient outcomes.3
Existing evidence on the impacts of publicly reporting 
individual performance outcomes offers varied results. One 
study describing Los Angeles schoolteacher performance 
concludes that openly disclosing performance outcomes to 
one’s peers and the public drove improvement by appealing 
to the teachers’ desire to protect their reputations and allowing 
them to benchmark their individual effectiveness vs their 
peers.’4 However, the study also found deleterious effects in one 
subgroup that experienced feelings of anger and embarrassment, 
which ultimately hampered intrinsic motivation. 
To our knowledge, there are no studies to date that 
examine the outcomes of reporting individual performance 
outcomes of physicians. This study aimed to determine 
whether open reporting of a select set of performance metrics 
at the individual physician level could influence individual 
behavior and drive future improvements in those measured 
metrics. Specifically, we examined performance within an 
emergency department (ED) physician-in-triage (PIT) system. 
In our study, PIT physicians’ only tasks are to sort patients, 
based on a history and physical exam, into two groups—those 
that require further evaluation and stabilization vs those who 
require minimal to no further evaluation—and discharge 
patients in the latter group. PIT performance was subsequently 
openly published to all PIT physicians.
METHODS 
This was a retrospective review of individual emergency 
physicians’ (EP) triage-system performance data from 
a single-site, academic tertiary-care center’s ED over a 
12-month period from September 1, 2015, through August 31, 
2016. During this period, total ED census was 50,140 patients. 
The ED triage system consisted of three patient evaluation 
spaces and was staffed with one of 24 board-certified or 
board-eligible emergency medicine (EM) attending physicians 
and two to three EM nurses with 14 total hours of physician 
coverage per day from 10 am to midnight. Each physician’s 
“triage shift” consisted of seven hours patient evaluation and 
one hour of charting. On average, EM attending physicians 
worked 25% of their scheduled shifts as PITs. 
The EPs were informed that the triage system would have 
two goals: 1) Based on a limited history and exam, rapidly 
identify and sort (ie, “triage” patients into either a moderate-
to-high acuity group that required moderate-to-extensive 
evaluation and management or into a low-acuity group that 
required little to no management); and 2) disposition (which 
was primarily quantified as discharges from the ED but also 
included “direct” admits to the main hospital) of all patients in 
the low-acuity group, as appropriate. Patients sorted into the 
moderate-to-high acuity group were subsequently assigned 
to another EP for further care. For patients designated as 
moderate-to-high acuity, the EP would document a 1-3 sentence 
note describing the initial impression and order labs, imaging, 
and or medications via computerized order entry (COE) system. 
For patients who could be rapidly dispositioned, the EP would 
chart the full ED note and order all studies, medications, and 
prescriptions via COE. Based on these goals, we tracked the 
two performance measures for each individual physician: 1) 
mean number of patients triaged per shift; and 2) mean number 
of patients dispositioned per shift. 
Before data collection for this study began, the PIT 
system had been in place for three months to allow for any 
learning curve with this change to physician practice. We 
extracted these metrics for individual PIT physicians from the 
electronic medical record system without patient identifiers. 
Performance metrics for all 24 PIT physicians were reported 
on a quarterly basis openly to the PIT physician group; the 
average and standard deviation for each metric was also 
reported to the group. Performance metrics were not linked to 
any material or financial incentive or disincentive. While goals 
were reiterated quarterly and physicians were encouraged 
to practice as they deemed safe and appropriate, no specific 
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guidance or remediation strategies were created, administered, 
or required for any physician at any point before, during, or 
after the study period; physicians were free to apply or disregard 
the data as they wished.
After the study period, we examined the group’s average 
quarterly performance for all four quarters and trended the 
comparison over time. Using Student’s t-test, we compared the 
group’s average performance in the first quarter of the study vs 
the final quarter. Given the possibility that particular subgroups’ 
performance would evolve in different ways, we also compared 
the performance of the top and bottom quartile of performers.
RESULTS
During the first quarter, the average number of patients 
triaged and dispositioned over seven-hour shifts by all 
physicians were 29.1 (+5.5) and 16.4 (+4.3), respectively. For 
the second quarter, the average number of patients triaged 
and dispositioned were 31.9 (+6.1) and 17.8 (+ 5.0), while for 
the third quarter, the average number of patients triaged and 
dispositioned were 34.3 (+ 5.2) and 16.9 (+4.5), respectively. 
In the final quarter of the study period, the average number of 
patients triaged was 36.5 (+5.3), and the average number of 
patients dispositioned was 15.3 (+5.0). Results are summarized 
graphically in Figure 1. 
After Q1, the top and bottom 25% quartile groups by 
number of patients triaged were identified. These groups were 
determined a priori before analysis in order to avoid Type I 
error. The top 25% of Q1 performers increased their average 
numbers triaged from Q1-36.5 to Q4-40.3 (ie, a statistically 
insignificant increase of 3.8 patients per shift [p = 0.007; 
Table 2]). The bottom 25% of Q1 performers, on the other 
hand, increased their averages from Q1-22.4 to Q4-34.5 (ie, 
a statistically significant increase of 12.2 patients per shift [p 
= 0.0013; Table 2]). The number of patients dispositioned in 
Q1 vs Q4 was determined not to be statistically significant (a 
decrease of 1.1 patients per shift; p = 0.142; Table 1).  
DISCUSSION
Measuring physician performance is a difficult task 
as many variables are involved to performing the job of a 
physician. Physicians have historically been reluctant to have 
their efficiency of patient throughput objectively measured, 
given the many confounders that affect their daily decision-
making.13 These variables include,the following: input; 
lengthy or inefficient admission processes; patient disease 
characteristics; and system-level factors (eg, ED staffing, 
difficulty getting timely consultations, a lack of available 
inpatient beds, timeliness of labs or radiology interpretations).14 
Furthermore, many contend that elements involved in patient 
care, such as compassion and communication, are difficult for 
objective data capture yet contribute meaningfully to outcomes 
of morbidity and mortality.15
Increasing ED visits and concomitantly ED crowding 
represent a major challenge for healthcare systems across the 
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Figure 1. Average number of patients triaged vs dispositioned by yearly quarter for all providers ± standard deviation.
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Q1 Q4 95% Confidence interval (CI) for difference Q4 vs Q1 P-value
Number of patients dispositioned per shift 16.4 15.3     1.1 patient /shift; CI: -3.8 to 1.7 0.1424
Number of patients triaged per shift 29.2 36.5     7.3 patients/shift; CI: 4.18 to 10.5 <0.05
Table 1. Overall triage and disposition performance Q4 vs Q1.
Q1 Q4 Difference and confidence interval (CI) for Q4 vs Q1 P-value
Number of patients patients triaged per 
shift by top 25% performers
36.5 40.3        3.8 patients/shift; CI: 0.05 to 7.5 <0.05
Number of patients triaged per shift by 
bottom 25% performers
22.4 34.5      12.2 patients/shift; CI: 8.4 to 15.9 <0.05
Table 2. Triage and disposition performance by top and bottom quartile performers Q4 vs Q1.
country.16 The increase in wait times before patients are seen 
by a physician has led many facilities to adopt a PIT system as 
a strategy to alleviate ED crowding by improving throughput. 
PIT systems target and reduce initial long wait times for patients 
by ensuring rapid evaluation by a physician upon arrival to the 
ED. Orders are expedited with critically ill patients immediately 
identified and sent back to the main ED and low- acuity patients 
rapidly discharged. PIT programs have been proven to provide 
sustainable improvements in ED performance metrics such 
as including door-to-physician time, length of stay, and left 
without being seen visits, despite increasing ED volume.17 
The results of this study demonstrate that simply displaying 
attending physician performance metrics at quarterly meetings 
led to an increase in patients triaged per hour. Furthermore, the 
increase was most notable and statistically significant for the 
bottom 25th percentile of attending physicians, a cohort that 
improved their number of patients triaged per hour by 12.2 
patients, or 54% quarter-over-quarter. Although not statistically 
significant, there were still improvements in patients triaged 
per hour in the top 25th percentile performers of attending 
physicians, a cohort that was already outperforming its peers. 
This cohort increased the average patients triaged per hour by 
3.8, a 10.3% quarter-over-quarter increase.  
An increase in the number of patients triaged per hour has 
been shown to reduce waiting times and length of stay in the 
ED.17 While the significant investment required for designing, 
implementing, and evaluating the development of a PIT system 
must be considered, the long-term gains in various ED metrics 
may offset the upfront cost. Furthermore, once a triage system 
is established, publicly publishing triage performance metrics 
does not require any increase in resources, resulting in arguably 
only upside potential. 
Our results align with much of the current literature 
regarding workplace motivation, finding that workers are 
rewarded for measurable performance improvement. While the 
logic behind extrinsic motivators (eg, more money for better 
performance) is intuitive, other studies18 concerning workers 
who perform higher level cognitive tasks, such as physicians, 
have shown that the best use of money is to pay workers just 
enough to take the issue of money off the table. Once this 
is done, there appear to be three factors, so-called intrinsic 
motivators, that lead to better performance when performing 
tasks that require higher-level of thinking: 1) autonomy, the 
ability to self-direct; 2) mastery, the desire to be the best at our 
artform or tasks; and 3) purpose, the idea that what we do is 
important and connected to our inner belief system. Publishing 
performance metrics while simultaneously allowing physicians 
to maintain their autonomy (physicians were allowed to practice 
how they desired), achieve mastery (bottom-performing 
physicians, known to all as laggards in the cohort, dramatically 
improved their ability and performance relative to their 
peers), and purpose (physicians were informed that this was 
an important group goal), is a simple yet powerful solution to 
improve motivation and performance.  
Within healthcare, prior studies have only examined 
the effects of reporting performance at the institutional 
level with highly variable outcome measures and mixed 
results5,6,7,8 Interestingly, several studies demonstrated that 
public performance reporting had a greater effect on quality 
improvement than traditional performance evaluation alone and 
suggest that public performance reporting stimulates additional 
quality improvement activity,9,10,11 which then correlated with 
increased patient satisfaction and care outcomes.12
LIMITATIONS
There were some limitations to this study. First is the 
question of whether performance increased solely due 
to the psychologically motivating effect of the published 
performance data or physicians improved simply due to 
practice. We believe that this effect was mitigated by the fact 
that the PIT system had already been operational for several 
months prior to the start of the study, which should have been 
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adequate to adjust to any learning curve. Second, this study 
was performed at a single-center, academic tertiary care center 
and not a community ED where other factors may affect how 
physicians perform. There were a small number of attending 
physicians in this study, a total of 24. We did not control or 
analyze for volume of patients presenting during a given 
shift to the triage physician. It is possible, although unlikely, 
that arrival volume could affect triage per hour numbers in a 
systematic way. 
Additionally, we did not collect or analyze outcome 
data for patients triaged by the group or individuals. Speed 
could conceivably have a negative effect on quality or cost. 
Finally, institutional culture plays a role in terms of how such 
a study is received among their physician staff. Like most 
real-world processes, the University of California, Irvine ED 
triage system constantly evolved in real-time. It would be 
beneficial to determine whether this study’s findings could be 
duplicated in EDs with differing triage systems or for other 
ED performance indicators such as computed tomography 
utilization rates, length of stay, or patients per hour.
CONCLUSION
Most business organizations now look for a transcendent 
purpose within an organization to help foster a sense of 
contribution from their workforce. This study shows that 
public performance metrics had a correlation with increased 
performance among physicians. Public performance 
metrics can encourage mastery within one’s profession by 
demonstrating what was possible within the top 25% of 
performers. By reinforcing autonomy and allowing physicians 
to practice the way they prefer to, we increase engagement 
within the work force. This study also challenged the 
traditional belief that financial incentives are tied to increase 
in production. The lack of a financial incentive within this 
study did not deter improvement in performance. This 
study demonstrates it is possible to increase and improve 
performance without increasing departmental operational cost.
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